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In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
CLAUDIUS WALLICH, Deceased, 
FRED R. W ALLICH, 
Pftitioner and Appellant 
- vs -
A. C. 'VALLI CH, et al., 
Cross-Petitioners 
and Respnndwnts. 
Case No. 
10569 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
THE ORDER APPEALED FROM MUST BE RE-
'TER.SED BECAUSE IT REQUIRES APPELLANT 
TO ACCOUNT, CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION vVHICH HAS 
BECOME FINAL. 
For the purposes of this brief, Petitioner-Appellant 
\Vill adopt the principal propositions advanced in Re-
spondents' Brief and then demonstrate that the Order 
appealed from is erroneous in requiring appellant to 
arrount. 
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The propositions of respondents which appellant 
will treat in this brief are as follows : 
1. The provisions of paragraph 8 of the Will 
were incorporated in the Decree of Distribu-
tion. 
(Resp. Br., p. 8) 
2. ·The Decree of Distribution created a trust of 
which appellant was trustee. 
(Resp. Br., p. 13) 
3. When the Decree of Distribution has become 
final, it is conclusive upon the rights and dutirs 
of the parties. 
(Resp. Br., p. 24) 
Even if, for the purpose of demonstrating the rr-
roneousness of the order appealed from, all of these 
points of respondents be conceded, then the following is 
also true. 
The will has now ceased to exist as the document 
on which the rights of the parties are based. The Will 
has been merged in the Decree of Distribution. All rights 
now existing arise from the Decree of Distribution which 
has now become final and it is not open to collateral at-
tack. 
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The Decree of Distribution incorporated all the pro-
visions of paragraph 8 of the Will, not just some of 
them. Therefore, the Decree is to be read just as if it 
had recited, verbatim, all of the provisions of paragraph 
8 of the \Vill. (Resp. Rr., p. 11). 
One of these provisions is, "My said nephew in the 
administration of the trust herein imposed upon him 
Hhall act ... without the necessity of making any account-
ing of any nature to any person or party concerning the 
administration of his trust." (Resp. Br., p. 17) 
This language is entirely free from ambiguity. And 
lwing incorporated in the d(•cree, it is the final adjudi-
cation of the rights and dutiPs of the parties. 
It is well established that once the provisions m a 
\Vill have resulted or been incorporated in a final decree, 
the provisions of the decree are binding even though 
erroneous. 
The respondents could have attacked the validity of 
the provisions in \Vallich's Will providing for no ac-
counting in the probate proceedings before the decree 
was entered but did not. 
There are many cases holding that void provisions 
m a will that have been incorporated in a final decree 
of distribution are binding upon the parties. A number 
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of these cases are discussed in points I and III of Ap-
pellant's Opening Brief. 
The case of In re Loring's Esta.le, 29 Cal. 2d 423, 
175 P.2d 524 is particularly in point. The facts were that 
by final decree of distribution the estate had been dis-
tributed in trust for certain named beneficiaries, som<" 
of which were charitable organizations and one of which 
was a municipality outside the State of California. After 
the decree became final, the heirs sought to attack the 
trust on the ground that under California law a testator 
could not dispose of more than one-third of his property 
to charity and could not make a legacy to a municipality 
in another State. If there had been an appeal from the 
decree of distribution, these matters could havf' bern 
considered but no appeal was prosecuted and the Court 
held that these provisions in the decree of distribution 
were final and conclusive upon the parties, even thoug-h 
Hrroneous, and could not he attarked in a suhsPqlwnt pro-
rf'eding. 
In the Arizona case of Shattuck i:. Shattuck, G7 Ariz. 
122, 192 P. 2d 229, the provisions of the will created a 
trust and the will provisions were incorporated in the 
decree of distribution which had become final. It was con-
ceded that the trust provisions of the will violated tlw 
rule against perpetuities. Howe,ver, when the heirs triPd 
to break the will on this ground the Court held that 
they were barred by the final derree of distribution 
even if erroneous. 
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See other cases discussed in Appellant's Brief, pgs. 
lR-2~. 
ln the case at bar respondents are in the same position 
as the heirs in the cases cited. This is a subsequent pro-
ceeding in which the respondent attacks the validity of 
the provisions of paragraph 8 of the vVill in regard to no 
accounting being required. But this provision has been 
included in a final decree and even if erroneous cannot 
now hf' attacked. 
It follows that the order appealed from is Prroneous 
m requiring appellant to file an account and should be 
reversed upon this ground. The order is conflicting and 
directly contrary to the provisions of the final decree of 
distribution which state that no accounting shall be rP-
quired of the trustPe. Even if it be held that the require-
nwnt of accounting in 75-12-19, U.C.A. 1953, cannot be 
waivPd by a "\Yill, which is hy no means clear, the waivPr of 
ac>counting is clearly set fo·rth in the final decrPe and can-
not now hP disrPgardPd. 
Respondents' Brief, page 25, relies on TVood vs. 
JI rmr:z;m.a»i, 169 P. 2d 131, 16() (Orf'. 1946) which holds 
that a provision in a declaration of trust waiving an 
acrounting is not a har to an equitahh' action hy a h0n-
Pficiary for an accounting. The trust there involved was 
a private declaration of trust which had not lwen rna<le 
the subject of any prior court decrPe. 
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Respondents' Brief, page 23, also cites Br.oaks 
Estate, 30 P. 2d 1065, 83 Utah 506, wherein the adminis-
trator resigned and the court ordered him to account. 
The administrator filed his account and the court ordered 
him to turn over to his successor certain money and prop-
erty. The resigned administrator appealed from this or-
der claiming error in certain items. The case is obviously 
not in point. The court holds that the duties of the ad-
ministrator require him to account. The case at bar in-
volves a trust created by a decree of distribution, not an 
administrator and Brooks does not involve a waiver of 
accounting, as here. 
Resondents' Brief, page 24, cites Ehrngren vs. Gro-
lund, 19 Utah 411, 57 P. 269. This case fully supports ap-
pellant's position on this point. The decree of distribution 
which had become final ordered the executor to deposit a 
sum of money in a bank for the benefit of decedent's 
daughter. The executor did not comply with the decree 
and the daughter brought this action against the sureties 
on the executor's bond. 'The sureties tried to claim that 
they were not bound by the decree of distribution. The 
court held that the decree was conclusive and not subject 
to collateral attack in the absence of fraud. 
This is exactly what appellant contends in the case 
at bar. The decree of distribution here unequivocally 
orders that no accounting shall be required of appellant 
as trustee. But the trial court in this subsequent pro-
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ceeding ordered the trustee to account. This order is 
in direct conflict with the final decree of distribution and 
should be reverse-d on this ground. 
The authorities relied upon by respondent demon-
strate that respondent has not met or rebutted the prin-
cipal point urged by appellant in Points I and III of 
Appellant's Brief. Appellant again summarizes it below 
for emphasis. 
A provision in a will may be erroneous. For example, 
the will may create a trust which violates the rule against 
perpetuities (Shattiwk vs. Shattuck, sitpra); it may leave 
more than one-third of the estate in trust for charitable 
purposes in violation of statute (Loring's Estate, supra) 
or it may provide that the trustee to whom the residue 
of the estate is to be distributed shall not be required to 
render any accounting in alleged violation of 75-12-19, 
rr.c.A. 1953 (case at bar). Many other examples arP set 
forth in Point I of Appelant's Brief. 
In each such instance, the heirs may attack the valid-
ity of any of these will provisions during the course of the 
probate proceedings and the valldity of such provisions 
ran bP adjudicated prior to or in the decrPe of distri-
bution. 
However, when the heirs fail to make any objection 
to such an erroneus provision and the ProhatP Court pro-
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ceeds to incorporate it in a decree of distribution which 
has become final, the provisions of the decree are conclu-
sive and cannot be attacked by the heirs in a subsequent 
proceeding. 
Therefore, here, when the Trial Court granted the 
respondent's cross-petition for an order to require the 
appellant to account, it committed reversible error be-
cause the decree of distribution has incorporated into it 
the provisions of the "rill which direct that no accounting 
shall be required of appellant. The decree of distribution 
in this regard has become final and conclusive even 
though it may have been erroneous if attacked at the time 
of the hearing on the petition for distribution. The rt'-
spondents are now barred from attacking the validity of 
any of the provisions of the final decree including the pro-
vision relating to the waiver of accounting. 
Other subjects argued in Respondent's Brief have 
been fully presented in Appellant's Brief and need not be 
further argued at this time. 
It is respectfully submitted that for the reasons here-
in set forth and those set forth in Appellant's Opening 
Brief, the judgment must be reversed. 
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RPSPf~rtfully submitted, 
SKEEN, vVORSLEY, 
SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
By------------------------------------------------------
Joseph J. Palmer 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
and 
John L. Mace 
615 South Flower Street 
Los Angeles, California 
Attorneys for Appellant 
